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HARRY KALVEN, THE PROUST OF THE
FIRST AMENDMENT
Lee Bollinger*
A WORTHY TRADITION: FREEDOM OF SPEECH IN AMERICA. By
Harry Kalven, Jr. (edited by Jamie Kalven). New York: Harper &
Row. 1988. Pp. xxxii, 698. $35.

Reading A Worthy Tradition makes one nostalgic. For the generation of scholars who cut their first amendment teeth on Harry
Kalven's articles, this book offers the experience of a recaptured past.
The question is, however, does it offer anything more?
I
All the marks of Kalven's irresistible style of scholarship are here.
The discussion is about cases, and really only Supreme Court cases.
The opinions are described in careful, even loving, detail, sometimes
accompanied by long quotations, but always evidencing Kalven's remarkable capacity for synthesis of argument. His approach is documentary: the focus is literally on the building of a tradition, of a
jurisprudence, through Supreme Court decisions. Kalven clearly has a
romance with the Warren Court, but that is because he adores the
spirit that animates the conflicts between the Justices of that Court,
not because it was the Court of Justice Black, whom Kalven seems to
admire above all others. His enthusiasm for detailed case analysis
seems to diminish noticeably as the Burger Court emerges.
Kalven's approach is also distinctly non-interdisciplinary. Nowhere is the legal analysis disturbed by references or even citations to
the insights of philosophers, social scientists, or political theorists
(with the one exception of John Stuart Mill); and the reader most assuredly is never asked to do business with those traders of complex
thought such as structuralism, deconstruction, or contemporary continental philosophy.
In general, the book seems to deliberately shy away from large issues of social organization. Kalven is self-effacing and modest before
the big questions. At the very beginning of the book, for example, he
describes the elements of the "broad consensus on the kinds of
messages the government should leave alone" (p. 6), and he observes
approvingly that heresy and blasphemy are clearly outside the realm
of law to regulate. He then wonders: "Perhaps we would all be hap* Dean and Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School. - Ed.
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pier in a society with more religion and less free speech." But he
quickly closes the discussion by disclaiming, "That is an issue I am not
equipped to argue" (p. 7).
On the other hand, the book is not wholly devoid of grand ideas;
but they emerge in the essential intellectual vision through which the
free speech tradition is fashioned. The ideas are now familiar and relatively straightforward. Freedom of speech is fundamental to democratic self-government. At the core of free speech, therefore, as New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan 1 profoundly recognized, is the idea that
sedition is a constitutionally untenable category of speech. The scope
of free speech protection radiates, outward from that understanding:
The state is not to be trusted. While some weighty state interests require recognition of limits on free speech, the Court's task is to keep
those to a minimum, and to follow a general policy of overprotection
of speech. That policy flows from a belief that the harms of protected
"bad" speech are far less than the harms of losing "good" speech
when official regulation cuts too close to the first amendment bone.
With this simple vision, Kalven approaches case after case, everinterested in its detail and in its proper resolution. Small is indeed
beautiful in Kalven's world, significance resides in the particular.
Cases that seem unimportant are invested with high meaning. Thus,
Cohen v. California 2 is a "nominally trivial and faintly embarrassing
controversy," but Justice Harlan's opinion for the Court "exemplifies
the best of the judicial tradition as to the First Amendment" (p. 15).
Venturing inside the Justices' decisioruriaking process yields for
Kalven insights about that process not obtained by lesser scholars. Initially, he complains of the Justices' many methods of avoiding important issues: "[C]onstitutional principles would be more firmly
perceived by the legal community, and the public generally," Kalven
chides, "if the justices would be a little less clever and statesmanlike,
and would agree to confront and decide important constitutional
points which are fully upon them and on which there is no disagreement among them" (p. 12). Yet Kalven clearly enjoys knowing the
law from the inside. Of obscenity's definition that it be "utterly without redeeming social importance," Kalven is confident that it "evidences not a preoccupation with ridding society of the worthless in
speech but rather a shrewd tactic for limiting the regulation of the
obscene" (p. 19). This serves also as "evidence ... that the Court is a
political institution with its own strategies in a practical world" (p.
19). Or, of Justice Jackson's dissent in Kunz v. New York, 3 which
Kalven sees as missing the real point of the majority decision, Kalven
suggests that Jackson's elegant but ultimately beside the point dis1. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
2. 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
3. 340 U.S. 290 (1951).
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course may have resulted from "a tension that developed during the
judicial conference on the case.... " (p. 87).
In this painstaking elaboration of the cases, Kalven's beautiful and
clever phrasing surfaces just often enough to forestall monotony and
to excite renewed interest. Here are a few samples:
"It is a paradox of modem life that speech, although highly prized,
enjoys its great protection in part because it is so often of no concern
to anyone. To an almost alarming degree, tolerance depends not on
principle but on indifference" (p. 6).
On obscenity: "This unlikely issue has proved uniquely stubborn
and resistant. The Court has been handicapped by a treacherous political undertow: The justifications for obscenity regulation may be faint,
but the political passions invested in the issue are fierce" (p. 34). "Indeed, the idea of regulating obscenity by law while permitting case by
case challenges in the courts sometimes seems like an invention of the
Devil designed to embarrass and unhinge the legal system" (p. 34).
On close judicial scrutiny of loyalty oaths: "To subject a hypocritical ceremony to a hypercritical reading strikes me as not a bad form of
justice at all" (p. 353).
II

Yet, despite these enormous strep.gths of analysis and style, the big
question to be asked about A Worthy Tradition is what its future is, or
should be. Given the enormous effqrt that Jamie Kalven has expended
in rescuing the manuscript from oblivion, which as nearly everyone
knows was seriously incomplete at Harry Kalven's death, the question
is somewhat awkward. But it must be faced, not the least because
nearly everyone will ask it.
That A Worthy Tradition will become merely a period piece at best,
or a forgotten-because-outdated treatise at worst, are not implausible
answers to this difficult question. The first amendment "tradition" is
covered only partially. What has been long understood as the "core"
of the first amendment - Schenk 4 to Brandenberg, 5 obscenity, hostile
audience, fighting words - is addressed in depth, as are areas traditionally regarded as of lesser interest: loyalty oaths, limitations on the
speech of public employees, immigration, and legislative investigations. However, doctrines like prior restraint, time, place and manner
regulations, and symbolic speech are neglected, as are many areas of
first amendment law like broadcast regulation and commercial speech.
Although the free speech "tradition" which Kalven so elegantly
describes continues, and although that tradition still includes many of
the cases laid out in this book, a nearly two-decade-old synthesis
4. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
5. Brandenberg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
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would seem unlikely to remain interesting for very long. The book is
not without new concepts and ideas, but the knowledgeable reader
would probably say that many were already incorporated (and in
many cases more fully developed) in Kalven's earlier writings. That is
particularly true, for example, of the discussion of libel law and New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan.
To be sure, every now and then some novel tests are proposed.
About obscenity, for example, Kalven .suggests a distinction from
other speech: "In my view," he says, "the Court in Roth [6] f~ed to
perceive that obscenity deals not with ideas but with stimuli to the
imagination, with imagery anct fantasy. It therefore attempted to accommodate the regulation of the obscene with the non-regulation of
ideas generally."7 And with respect to very offensive ideas and_ the
threat of the violent response from a hostile audience, the issue in Terminie/lo v. Chi<;ago, 8 he proposes consideration of a "middle ground,"
between full protection a.Q.d official discretion to int~rrupt the speech:
There may be implicit in a situation like Ter(niniello .a kind of second- .
class speech which is generally permissible bu~ which is not sq val~able ...
that the right to utter it will be protected regardless of the, likely impact
on a hostile audience. But, if so, we are back full circle to JustiCe Roberts's insistence in Cantwell [9] that, if there are such categories of
speech, the legislature must locate and evaluate them. [pp. ·85~86]
But, if the truth be told, the book leaves these·ideas almost totally

undeveloped.
,
But then, Kalven's interest is· not in hew major first amendment
theories but in offering hisjudgment about how each case should have
been decided, how the tradition should have been developed. · With
keen appreciation of the difficulties and burdens shouldered by any
judge, Kalven nevertheless frequently urges the Court to give speech
more protection. For example, Kalven's objection to Feiner v. New
York, 10 which let a.hostile audience override the ~peaker, begins with a
sympathetic appreciation of the Court's dilemma. He wonders
whether "we may be asking the police to perform an impossible task
- not merely to allow freedom for the thought they hate but to go
down fighting on the side of the utterer of that thought." And he
wonders whether the Court "can really supervise the norm," given
that it is "so far from the street comer" (p. 92). But then Kalven's
passion for free speech firms and he is resolute. He says that "underwriting broad police discretion" here "seems wrong." "The Court
should not underestimate its symbolic and educative role. It can affect
6. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
7. P. 18. See also p. 41.
8. 337 U.S. 1 (1949).
9. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
10. 340 U.S. 315 (1951).
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the attitude and training of the police, and it can influence the popular
attitude, which in turn will affect the police." Concluding that keeping the forum of the streets open is "central to the dynamics of dissent
among free men," he proposes his solution: "The police must make a
serious effort to keep order before silencing the speaker; and the
Supreme Court must remain open to review of that effort" (p. 92).
And then there is Kalven's elegant summary at the end of his discussion of the hostile audience, or as he calls it "reflexive disorder,"
problem:
In the end, the Court's hesitation to commit itself further on principle in this area may reflect not only the intransigence of the reflexive
disorder issue in a turbulent, real world but also a certain political
shrewdness in keeping its options open. As the dramatis personnae have
changed over the past three decades from Jehovah's Witnesses to Young
Progressives to crypto-fascists to Negro civil rights groups to anti-Vietnam protestors, there has been abundant indication that street corner
speech remains close to a vital nerve in the society and that it is treacherous to attempt to classify with finality the form the reflexive disorder
problem is likely to assume when protest takes to the streets. [p. 118]

Different people will find different things to object to in Kalven's
analyses, but the objections probably will take a similar form, which is
that Kalven's analysis is too slight for modem scholarly tastes. Some,
perhaps most, will object to the slipperiness, or the incompleteness, of
Kalven's doctrinal lines. He can seem to evade difficult problems.
How should the Court perform its "symbolic and educative role," assuming one exists? What, after all, will constitute a "serious effort" by
the police to protect a speaker? And just how should the Court "remain open to review" those decisions of the police?
I am far less troubled by this side of the free speech equation and
far more troubled by Kalven's under-appreciation of the "state interest" side for limiting or restricting speech. I detect two problems here.
One is the sense he creates, by continually speaking of "state interests," that these interests are just those of some alien and distant government entity and not those of the public at large. The other problem
is more serious: that is Kalven's frequent effort, no doubt unconscious, to contain - or privatize - the nature of the "state" or "public" interest which supports measures to limit speech behavior.
Thus, with respect to obscenity, Kalven articulates the "state interest" as "the evil of exciting the sexual fantasies of adults," in which
"[p]resumably, the underlying concern, although contemporary
lawmakers ... have rarely been candid enough to say so, is with masturbation" (p. 34). With slight bemusement at the earnestness of regulatory efforts, he says "[t]he question is whether this state interest is
sufficient, in the case of consenting adults, to justify the solemn intervention of the law." To Kalven the harm of obscenity seems "faint"
(p. 34).
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Similarly, with respect to libel, .Kalven describes the problem as
"how best to accommodate the individual interest in reputation and
the public interest in unrestrained debate of public issues." 11
In both of these instances, Kalven seems to understate seriously
the public interest in regulation. Of course, it may be unfair to take
today's heightened sensitivity to the social role of pornography and to
use it to criticize someone writing in the early 1970s. But remember
the question I am raising is the present and continued relevance of A
Worthy Tradition. From that perspective, Kalven's discussion of obscenity has a distinctly anachronistic ring to it. Likewise, the isolation
of the injury of libel to mere "private" reputational interest seems
strangely understated. For someone of Kalven's remarkable sensitivity to the needs of a democratic society, it is an odd lapse not to raise
the question of what kind of democratic society will result from lifting
the legal fetters on defamatory statements.
To be sure, Kalven is not wholly unaware of the larger public values put at risk by various kinds of speech. Though at various points
he characterizes the "reflexive disorder" cases as merely threatening a
public interest in "order," Kalven does give a quite sensitive portrayal
of Justice Jackson's powerful dissent in Terminiel/o, in which Jackson
discusses the larger political consequences of extremist speakers:
First, the situation may be one which is being manipulated as a conscious strategy of inducing disorder, even against the speaker. This is
the dilemma posed by contemporary tactics of confrontation designed to
trick "the system" into overreacting, thereby precipitating disorder and
disenchantment. Second, the speech must be placed in the context of
tensions that exist at the moment the speaker chooses to speak or to
continue speaking; the speaker may inherit a situation in which further
speaking will be the trigger of disorder. . . . Third, in a tense situation
with factions in the audience, language which is neutral in form may
take on meaning as incitement. [p. 85]

For Kalven, Jackson deserved credit "for properly sobering the issue"
(p. 85), which Jackson did yet again in his dissent in Kunz v. New
York But Kalven finds Jackson's fears somewhat irrelevant to the
facts of those cases, noting that the Court in any event seemed willing
to permit legislatures to draft statutes to guide the police officer on the
spot, and he concludes with the observation that, since legislatures
have not bothered to enact such statutes, we must face "a point of
principle - the worthless offending speech cannot be safely disentangled" (p.88). The issues are not pursued further.
I should note that Kalven sees incitement as presenting potentially
serious social problems. At the outset of his discussion of subversive
advocacy, Kalven says: "We reach here the ultimate battleground for
free speech theory - the area in which the claims of censorship are at
11. P. 60. See also p. 71.
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once most compelling and most dangerous to key values in an open
society" (p. 119). Still, when all is said and done, Kalven's sensitivities
lean naturally in the direction of developing the free speech dimension
of democratic self-government, not speech's threat to that value. As
such the book is somewhat less convincing, and less contemporary,
than one might wish. There can be, as it were, a lightness to the
analysis.
So what, then, is the value of this book? The simple fact is that I
loved reading it. I know I shall return to it again and again, and I
think I know why.
It is too easy to lose the forest for the trees with this book. Kalven,
as I have said, wanted to document a "tradition," and to do that he
reasonably thought it necessary to explore in depth - indeed, as if he
were the deciding judge - every single case. The reader, however,
can't help wondering, as case after case rises to meet you, whether this
book is really the first draft all authors must write before the process
of distilling important insights and themes can begin. Whether that is
true or not I aiµ uncertain. But I do know that the careful reader can
unearth nuggets of insights and themes unavailable elsewhere.
At the heart of this book is one critically important idea, which
though frequently referred to, is in the end left somewhat inchoate:
the history of the first amendment is a process of the law "working
itself pure" (p. 361). Kalven seems to have in mind the idea that the
Court's struggle through the labyrinth of cases over several decades
was a necessary and inevitable process to develop a full-bodied first
amendment. Living now, as we do, in that speech-secure world,
Kalven seems to suggest, it is difficult for us to grasp both the heroism
of that struggle a~d the complexity those problems presented to judges
of high talent, good faith, and commitment. Just going through the
process ourselves, he seems to think, is an education.
It is a fundamental idea of the book that the interaction of factual
detail with principle and theory enriches the principle and theory.
Without detail~ ideas become bloodless and abstract, and end up having nothing to do with anything. 12 This central thesis illustrates why
some Supreme Court opinions are important and valuable and some
a,ren't, and also why Kalven's own method is itself important and valuable. Along the way, this profound notion of knowledge and understanding yields comment after comment of sensitive insight: on how it
may be important to the resolution of a particular case to minimize the
significance of the speaker (as Holmes was frequently inclined to do),
but how .that tactic fails to help build a tradition of respect for dissent
(p. 156); on how the context of the dissent, with its liberation of eloquence from the chains of compromise that always accompany vie12. See pp. 3, 194.
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tory, may have been critical to the emergence of a tradition of free
speech (pp. 149, 158); on how remarkable it is that so much of the free
speech tradition comes from the pens of elderly people (Holmes,
Meiklejohn, and Brandeis were all in their seventies when they wrote
their memorable passages on free speech) (p. 162); on how there is a
"dialogue between the society and the Court" (p. 181), which the
Court can usefully exploit by being generous or ungenerous toward
legislative attempts to fashion restrictions on speech. 13
Kalven himself is at times impatient with the wrangling. over tests.
He complains that lawyers are often diverted into "Talmudic analysis
of competing formulae" and overlook "the value of radical criticism of
society" (p. 149). What's really important, he insists, is that we understand the reasons why we want to protect speech; that will give far
more protection to speech than any test. But somehow, it seems, and
this is the intriguing thesis, the tussle with tests is what provides the
revelation about purpose.
Ultimately, it must be said, this book has enduring value because
Harry Kalven was a person of remarkable judgment. Ideals are kept
in clear vision, and the particulars of the actual world direct the analysis. What might seem relevant in a broad philosophical discussion becomes less so in a world with a real problem to solve. There is never
the sense that Kalven's mind is either unable or unwilling to pursue
any line of thought, should it be raised and important. While there is
receptivity because of problems to be solved, there is quickness in handling ideas for the same reason. His analysis is always just as good,
and often better, than the best Justice in the case. And that's in the
end how this book should be i:ead. Kalven had earned the right to
enter his judgments. In a better world, Harry Kalven would have
been a Supreme Court Justice. This book makes him one.

13. See, e.g., p. 347.

